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Abstract 
This paper derives optimal loan policies under asymmetric information where banks offer loan 
contracts of long and short duration, backed or unbacked with collateral. The main novelty of 
the  paper  is  that  it  analyzes  a  setting  in  which  high  quality  firms  use  collateral  as  a 
complementary  device  along  with  debt  maturity  to  signal  their  superiority.  The  least-cost 
signaling equilibrium depends on the relative costs of the signaling devices, the difference in 
firm quality and the proportion of good firms in the market. Model simulations suggest a non-
monotonic relationship between firm quality and debt maturity, in which high quality firms 
have both long-term secured debt and short-term secured or non-secured debt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The role of asymmetric information on debt maturity choices has been the subject of a 
debate for quite some time, both in the theoretical and empirical  literature. Among 
other theoretical studies in this field (Robbins and Schatzberg, 1986; Kale and Noe, 
1990  and  Diamond,  1993),  the  models  by  Flannery  (1986)  and  Diamond  (1991) 
emphasize the signaling properties of the debt maturity choice. In both models, firms 
have private information about their two-period projects and firms may signal their 
quality by borrowing  on a short-term  basis. However,  there  are also  considerable 
differences between the two models. Flannery analyzes a complete contracting model 
for high and low quality firms, while Diamond considers an incomplete contracting 
model for firms with different risk ratings. Unlike Flannery’s model, the Diamond’s 
model assumes short-term liquidity risk. The empirical implications of both models 
also differ. Flannery’s model predicts debt maturity to be positively related to firms’ 
quality: high quality firms will borrow on a long-term basis, whereas low quality 
firms will use short-term debt. The model by Diamond, on the other hand, predicts a 
non-monotonic relationship between firm risk and debt maturity. In his model,  the 
extremely risky firms do not have access to long term debt and need to borrow short, 
the intermediate-risk firms will borrow long and the low risk firms will borrow short.  
   3 
The empirical literature provides some support for the theoretical models proposed by 
Flannery and Diamond. Consistent with the predictions of Flannery and Diamond, 
Berger et al. (2004), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Barclay and Smith (1995) find that 
firms with high bond ratings tend to use more short-term debt while firms with low 
bond ratings tend to have more long-term debt and firms without ratings have short-
term debt. In contrast to the empirical predictions of both models, moreover, several 
empirical papers demonstrate that high quality firms do borrow on a long-term basis. 
For instance, Scherr and  Hulbert  (2001), using  an  accounting  measure-Altman Z-
score-to proxy for credit quality, find that high quality firms borrow on both a long- 
and short-term basis whereas low quality firms are restricted to long-term debt only. 
Furthermore,  Molina  and  Penas  (2004)  provide  evidence  in  favor  of  high  quality 
firms that use long-term debt. Thus, unlike the predictions of the main signaling debt 
maturity models, the empirical literature suggests that high quality firms may borrow 
on both short- and long-term bases
 1.   
This paper contributes to the literature on signaling and debt maturity choice. In line 
with Flannery’s and Diamond’s work, our model considers a two-period asymmetric 
information  setting  between  firms  of  different quality  and a perfectly  competitive 
bank. However, in contrast to all models we are aware of, we allow firms to signal 
                                                            
1For other empirical papers testing the choice of debt maturity as a signaling tool, see e.g. 
Guedes and Opler (1996), Mitchell (1993), and Scherr and Hulburt (2001).   4 
with two debt instruments. Specifically, we analyze the case where firms have the 
possibility to signal with collateral, in addition to debt maturity. In practice,  debt 
contracts  often  contain  clauses  regarding  both  debt  maturity  and  collateral.  Our 
analysis therefore deals with an important policy issue, and is more in accordance 
with the  observed  regularities than are the models  that  analyze  a  single  signaling 
instrument
2. Our aim is to derive optimal loan policies under asymmetric information 
where banks offer loan contracts of long and short duration, backed or unbacked with 
collateral
3. Our model provides a theoretical backing to a wide range of empirical 
outcomes. Further, in line with Diamond and Flannery, our model predicts the most 
risky firms to borrow on a long-term basis without collateral. However, for the less 
risky firms our model provides a justification for borrowing short-term debt, with or 
without  collateral,  and  borrowing  long-term  debt  without  collateral.  Thus,  our 
analysis provides a broader justification for empirical regularities than most existing 
models. 
                                                            
2 Since we focus on signaling properties of duration and collateral, we abstract from other 
factors associated with the debt maturity and collateral decisions. Therefore, we do not deal 
with e.g. tax-timing arguments  of the  debt maturity  structure (see e.g. Brick and Palmon, 
1992), maturity-matching arguments of duration, liquidity risk arguments of short-term debt 
(see Diamond, 1991) and the consequences of a firm’s debt maturity decision on agency costs 
(see e.g. Myers, 1977). We also abstract from traditional trade-off theory arguments related to 
collateral, according to which a firms ability to obtain funds from banks is limited to the value 
of its collateralizable assets. 
3 The screening and signaling role of collateral has been theoretically well explored by Bester 
(1985, 1987),  Besanko and Thakor (1987). See Coco (2000) for a more extensive survey.   5 
We show that the choice for and the relevance of using either a particular signaling 
instrument  or  two  signaling  instruments  at  the  same  time,  depends  e.g.  on  the 
proportion of good firms in the market, the difference in quality between the firm 
willing to signal and the most risky firm in the market, and the relative costs of the 
available signaling possibilities. To better explain the empirical implications of our 
model, we describe a possible set of outcomes based on a model simulation. This 
simulation provides evidence suggesting a non-monotonic relationship between firm 
quality and debt maturity. For a particular parameter setting, we show that the most 
risky firm will borrow long without collateral, firms that are slightly less risky and the 
group  with  the  lowest  risk  firms  will  borrow  long  with  collateral,  and  the 
intermediate-risk  firms  will  borrow  short,  with  or  without  collateral.  Most 
importantly,  our  analysis  shows  that  the  resulting  equilibrium  depends  on  a 
combination of a wide range of parameters, and therefore cannot be described by a 
simple rule, such as high quality firms will borrow short and low quality firms will 
borrow long. The crux of the matter is that the choice for short or long term debt also 
depends  on  the  availability  and  costs  of  other  signaling  instruments.  This  seems 
obvious,  but  has  never  been  taken  into  account  in  the  existing  empirical  and 
theoretical debt maturity literature.   
The paper is organized into 6 sections. Section 2 provides a general outline of the 
model.    Section  3  derives  the  bank’s  optimal  loan  strategy  in  a  full  information   6 
setting. Section 4 introduces asymmetric information and examines the optimal loan 
policy.  Section  5  sets  out  some  empirical  implications  of  the  analyses.  Section  6 
summarizes our results and provides some areas for further research.  
 
2. GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE MODEL 
We  consider  a  two-period  model  with  firms  and  a  competitive  banking  system 
embodied  by  a representative  bank. At time t=0,  firms  are  endowed with a risky 
investment project which lasts for two periods. If the investment project is carried out, 
all cash flows will occur at the end of period 2. Firms do not have initial wealth, 
which  necessitates  outside  finance.  All  investment  projects  require  a  unit  of 
investment, and thus a unit of external finance. The projects can be financed with 
short-term (s) or long-term (l) debt. The maturity time (m ∈ (l,s)) in the model should 
be interpreted as being defined relative to the timing of the cash flows, rather than in 
terms of calendar time (see Diamond, 1991). Firms need to pay an additional amount 
of fixed transaction cost b if they issue short-term debt instead of long-term debt. 
There  are  two  types  of  firms,  good  (g)  and  bad  (b),  who  differ  in  their  “up” 
probabilities – probabilities of success pi, so the type of firm i ∈ (g,b). The proportion 
of good firms is equal toθ. Under the asymmetric information setting, the bank only 
knows ex-ante the distribution of firms (i.e. the bank knows that a proportion θ of the   7 
firms are  good borrowers), but  the  particular borrower’s  probability  of  success  is 
private.  
During each period there is a probability pi that the project increases in value. M1 M2 
are the interim values of the project at t=1. At t= 0 the bank and the firms know that 
the  project’s  liquidating  value  at  t  =2  will  be  M3  with  probability
2
i p ,  M4  with 
probability 2pi(1-pi) and 0 with probability (1-pi)
2.   
The time profile of the project’s value is similar to the Flannery’s (1986) profile, as 
described in Figure 1. 
In addition to the interest factor (one plus the loan rate: Ri), the perfectly competitive 
bank may require collateral (Ci) and seize it in case the project’s liquidation value is 
insufficient to repay the debt. Firms have other asset(s) which cannot be liquidated at 
t=0 or t=1 for financing purposes, but can be posted as collateral. Firms face the cost 
of collateralization, which is proportional to the amount of collateral they post. This 
cost can be recognized as the costs of collection and marketing of the collateralized 
assets (Barro, 1976), legal or monitoring cost (Chan and Kanatas, 1985) or dissipative 
cost in liquidating collateral (Boot, Thakor, Udell, 1991) and are entirely incurred by 
firms as borrowers.  
   8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: time profile of the model 
We assume the following: 
A.1: 0<pb <pg<1 
A.2: Firms and the bank are risk neutral 
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A.3: The bank makes zero profits 
A.4: The risk-free interest rate (the opportunity cost of capital per loan) is zero. 
A.5: M1, M2, M3, and M4 are larger than the promised debt repayments (principal plus 
interest). 
A.6:    The  transaction  costs  (refinancing  costs)  of  short-term  debt  equal  b;  the 
transaction costs of long-term debt equal 0. 
A.7: Firms finance their investment projects with either short- or long-term debt. We 
ignore the possibility of a combination of the two forms of debt. 
A.8: The costs of collateral are proportional to the amount of collateral by a factor k, 
so additional costs of collateralization equal kC. 
A.9:  0 1 Ci ≤ <   
A.10: The firms’ collaterizable wealth W exceeds the needed collateral. 
Most assumptions of our model are straightforward. Some, however, need additional 
explanation. A.5 implies that we assume that all debt maturing at t=1 is riskless (no 
liquidity risk), which is in line with Flannery’s (1986) assumption. This assumption is 
made to not further complicate the model. An obvious drawback of this choice is that 
we  ignore  the  possibility  of  firms’  short-term  liquidation.  Several  papers  (e.g.   10 
Diamond, 1991) emphasize that using short-term debt is advantageous since short-
term debt may help to avoid strategic defaults by the threat of short-term liquidation 
of the firm. A.6 reflects the assumption that total transaction costs for short-term debt 
are  higher  than  for  long-term  debt,  the  reason  being  that  firms,  which  decide  to 
finance with short-term debt need to consult more often (twice as much in our model) 
to a bank than firms who finance with long-term debt. The transaction costs b for 
short-term debt can therefore be interpreted as the additional costs of financing with 
short-term  debt  rather  than  with long-term  debt.  A.8  explains  how  we  model  the 
costly collateralization. Like Bester (1985), firms bear these costs, and banks do not 
take them into account when setting an interest rate. In many papers on this topic 
(Barro,  1976,  Chan  and  Kanatas,  1985,  Boot,  Thakor  and  Udell,  1991),  cost  of 
collateralization creates a disparity in value of collateral between banks and firms
4. 
A.9 implies that we rule out the uninteresting case where loans can become entirely 
riskless if they are backed by collateral. Finally, A.10 implies that we assume that 
firms are not wealth constrained since the value of the collaterizable assets W always 
exceeds the collateral requirement.  
 
                                                            
4  Some  papers,  e.g.  Boot,  Thakor  and  Udell  (1991),  assume  that  the  dissipative  costs  of 
collateral  are  smaller  for  long-term  debt  than  for  short-term  debt.  The  reason  for  this 
difference is that the bank has more timing flexibility in terms of when to force default with   11 
3. FULL INFORMATION 
To provide a benchmark, we start by assuming that the bank can identify the quality 
of the borrowers without costs. From Figure 1 we derive the valuation of a firm’s 
equity if it borrows long (l) or short (s)
5, puts up a positive amount of collateral (Ci > 
0) or zero collateral (Ci = 0). Assuming risk neutrality and a zero risk-free discount 
rate, we obtain the following results. 
If a firm i, i ∈ {g, b) borrows long the valuation of its equity (Vli) is equal to 
(1) 
2 2
3 4 ( ) 2 (1 )( ) (1 ) (1 ) li i li li i i li li i li V p M R kC p p M R kC p k C = − − + − − − − − +  
2 2
3 4 2 (1 ) (2 ) (1 ) i i i i i li i li li p M p p M p p R p C kC = + − − − − − −  
where Rli is the loan interest rate on long-run debt for borrower i.   
If a firm i uses short-run debt, the equity value (Vsi) is equal to 
                                                                                                                                                        
long-term  debt  than  with  short-term  debt.  However,  this  result  is  based  on  the  idea  of 
renegotiating possibilities, which we ignore.  
 
5 Recall that long-term debt is two-period debt issued at t=0 and that short-term debt is one-
period debt issued at t=0 and t=1. Moreover, recall that we assume that short-term debt issued 
at t=0 is riskless (so that the lending rate equals 1) and that short-term debt issued at t=1 is 
risky. 
   12 
(2)
2( 1 ) (1 )( 1 ) 3 4
2 (1 )( ) (1 ) (1 ) 4
2 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 3 4
V p M kC p p M kC si si i i si i
p p M R kC b p k C i i si si i si
p M p M p p p C p p R kC b i i i i si i i si si i
= − − + − − −
+ − − − − − − +
= + − − − − − − − −
  
With perfect information, the bank knows the borrowers’ probability of success (the 
“up” probabilities). Under the zero profit constraints, the short and long term loan 
rates are given by: 
(3) 
2 1 (1 ) 2 2 1 2 (1 ) (1 )
(2 )
p C i li R p p p p C R li i i i li li i p p i i
− −   = + − + − ⇒ =     −
 
(4) 
1 (1 )
1 (1 )
si i
i si i si si
i
C p
pR p C R
p
− −
= + − ⇒ =  
By substituting (3), and (4) in (1) and (2), respectively, the equity values for a firm i 
using short or long-term debt can be derived: 
(5) 
2
3 4 2 (1 ) 1 li i i i li V p M p p M kC = + − − −  
(6)
2
3 4 2 (1 ) 1 si i i i si V p M p p M kC b = + − − − −  
We also assume that the credit contracts are individually rational, i.e., 
A.11: Vim >0 for i ∈ {g, b} and m ∈ {l, s}   13 
Proposition 1:  Under A1-A11, the full information competitive equilibrium implies 
that both groups of firms borrow long without collateral. So, the full information 
equilibrium policy is given by
1
(2 )
Rli p p i i
=
−
; 0 Ci =  andm l i = . 
Proof: This solution of the optimal loan policy is straightforward. The bank optimizes 
each type of borrower’s expected utility subject to the zero profit constraints and the 
participation constraints. It is obvious that the bank’s optimal policy will never imply 
that a firm borrows short or that the loan is backed by collateral, since borrowing 
short and/ or securing a loan is costly.￿ 
 
4. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION  
We now assume that the bank does not know the type of the firm it faces, i.e. the 
probability of success of the firms is unknown to the bank. The bank will therefore set 
an average loan interest rate, which may cause the good firms to be undervalued and 
the risky firms to be overvalued. In this section, we attempt to examine whether good 
firms can signal their superior quality by using two debt instruments, maturity and 
collateral and how the signaling mechanism works. We aim to derive the optimal loan 
policy  in  equilibrium.  Before  proceeding  we  explain  the  equilibrium  concept  we 
employ.   14 
 
4.1 THE EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT 
In  our  model,  we  focus  on  Perfect  Bayesian  Equilibria  (PBE)
6,  which  can  be 
classified into separating PBE and pooling PBE. Separating PBE occur when each 
type of firm chooses a different borrowing strategy;  the observed signal therefore 
reflects the firm’s type correctly. Pooling PBE occur when both types of firm opt for 
the  same  borrowing  strategy;  the  observed  signal  therefore  reveals  no  additional 
information about the firm’s type. Since the PBE concept does not impose restrictions 
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs we follow the concept of the Intuitive Criterion (IC) 
formulated by Cho and Kreps (1987) to rule out perfect Bayesian equilibria that are 
upheld by unreasonable off-equilibrium beliefs.
7 In line with Spence (1973) and Riley 
(1979), the separating signaling equilibria we consider should satisfy the Incentive 
Compatibility Constraint (ICC) and  the Competitive Rationality Condition  (CRC). 
The ICC ensures that each agent is personally interested in accepting the contract 
designed for his type rather than the contract designed for the other type of agent. The 
CRC in our setting requires the credit market to be perfectly competitive and banks to 
have rational expectations so that in equilibrium they do not make profits and the loan 
                                                            
6 A PBE is defined as a set of strategies and beliefs such that (Rasmusen, 1989, p. 146): 1) the 
strategies for the remainder of the game are Nash given the beliefs and strategies of the other 
players; 2) the beliefs at each information set are rational given the evidence appearing thus 
far in the game. This means that along the equilibrium path beliefs are based on priors updated 
by Bayes’ Rule, if possible. Off the equilibrium path, Bayes updating is not possible since the 
deviating action is taken with probability zero in equilibrium. 
 
7 The IC restricts the  out-of-equilibrium beliefs  by requiring that the  uninformed player’s 
belief must put zero probability on an informed player who would not benefit from the off-
equilibrium action no matter what beliefs were held by the bank. We use the IC to rule out 
unreasonable perfect Bayesian pooling equilibria. Note that in the setting of Rotschild and 
Stiglitz (1976) there cannot be a pooling Nash equilibrium under asymmetric information.   15 
interest rate correctly reflects firms’ riskiness. Our model proposes a continuum of 
separating  equilibria,  but  the  IC  restricts  the  separating  equilibria  to  least-cost 
separating equilibria. These equilibria are such that the bad firms do not signal, and 
the  good  firms  choose  the  minimum  level  of  signaling  that  allows  them  to  be 
separated without attracting the bad firms. These equilibria are the most efficient, 
perfect Bayesian equilibria, in that they entail the least wasteful signaling costs.  
 
4.2 THE BORROWING AND SIGNALING POSSIBILITIES 
Table 1. Different borrowing strategies  
Good\Bad  L with C   L without C  S with C  S without C 
L with C  1: P  2: S  3: S   4: S 
L without C  5: S  6: P  7: S   8: S  
S with C  9: S  10: S  11: P  12: S  
S without C  13: S  14: S  15: S   16: P 
Notes: P (S) means a candidate pooling (separating) equilibrium. L denotes long-term debt; S denotes 
short-term debt; C denotes collateral.  
 
Table 1 presents all possible borrowing choices for both types of firms. The optimal 
borrowing strategy of each type depends on the behavior of the other type. If good 
firms succeed in signaling their quality by borrowing short, with or without collateral,   16 
or by borrowing long with collateral, a separating equilibrium may occur. However, 
bad firms may decide to mimic good firms and good firms can voluntarily decide not 
to  signal  their  quality.  By  doing  so,  both  groups  of  firms  may  opt  for  a  pooling 
equilibrium if they achieve higher values.  
 
4.3 THE SET OF PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA 
We identify the set of PBE by ruling out borrowing possibilities that do not constitute 
a PBE. Under these possibilities, bad firms always tend to deviate from the original 
borrowing  strategy  to  the  perfect  information  strategy  no  matter  what  the  bank 
believes. This rule allows us to discard immediately all separating possibilities where 
bad firms signal, depicted as  cases 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 15 in Table 1. If 
separation  occurs,  bad  firms  always  prefer  not  to  signal  to  avoid  signaling  costs. 
Thus, for any contract that is a candidate for a separating equilibrium, the contract 
offered by the bad firm should coincide with its full information contract (see, for 
instance, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 2001, p. 203, Result 5.6). Furthermore, 
we also eliminate conceivable pooling equilibria, where bad firms have incentives to 
switch to their full information contract. This may occur for all conceivable pooling 
equilibria with positive signaling costs. Thus, we derive conditions for which moving 
to the full information contract provides bad firms with a higher value than pooling. If   17 
such conditions do not hold, separating equilibria do not exist. In order to make the 
necessary calculations, we need to derive expressions for the common interest rates if 
firms  decide  to  pool.  There  are  several  possibilities.  They  may  pool  by  both 
borrowing long or by both borrowing short: in both cases they may back the loan with 
collateral. Under a pooling equilibrium, the bank knows that the proportion of good 
firms is θ  and the proportion of bad firms is 1 -θ . To comply with the Competitive 
Rationality Condition, the long pooling loan rate is given by: 
(7)   
2 2 1 2 (1 ) (1 )
2 2 (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 )
2 2 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
(2 ) (1 )(2 )
R p p p p C lp g g g g lp
R p p p p C lp b b b lp b
C p p lp g b
Rlp p p p p g g b b
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
  = + − + −    
  + − + − + −    
  − − + − −     ⇒ =
− + − −
 
 
The short pooling loan interest rate is determined as follows. We know that short-
term debt issued at t = 0 is riskless since all firms reach either M1 or M2. However, 
short-term debt issued at t=1 is subject to default risk if the borrowers decrease in 
value at t=2.  Since good and bad firms differ in their probabilities of reaching M2, (1- 
pg) of the good firms and (1-pb) of the bad firms will arrive at state M2. Therefore   18 
(1 )
1 ( (1 ) )
pg
p p g b
θ
θ θ
  −
 
− + −    
 of good firms and (1 )(1 )
1 ( (1 ) )
pb
p p g b
θ
θ θ
  − −
 
− + −    
 of bad firms borrow at t 
= 1. Under CRC or the zero profit constraints, the loan rate then must satisfy 
 (8)
2 2 1 ( (1 ) ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
p p C p p g b sp g b
Rsp p p p p g g b b
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
  − + − − − + − −     =
− + − −
      
The subscript p denotes pooling.  
Lemma 1:  (i) the candidate pooling equilibrium where both groups of firms borrow 
long with collateral is not a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if   
(9)
(2 ) (2 )
(1 ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 )
g g b b
lp
g g b b b b
p p p p
C
k p p p p kp p
θ
θ
  − − −   ≥
  + − − − + −  
 
(ii)  The  candidate  pooling  equilibrium  where  both  groups  of  firms  borrow  short 
without  collateral  is  not  a  perfect  Bayesian  equilibrium  if 
(10)
1 ( (1 ) )
(1 ) 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
g b
p b b
g g b b
p p
b p p
p p p p
θ θ
θ θ
  − + −
≥ − −  
− + − −    
.  
(iii) The candidate pooling equilibrium where both groups of firms borrow short with 
collateral is not a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if    19 
(11)
(1 )(1 )( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 )( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
g b g b g g b b
sp
g b g b g g b b
p p p p b p p p p
C
p p p p k p p p p
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
  − − − − − + − −   ≥
  − − − + − + − −  
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
The conditions (9), (10) and (11) determine when bad firms prefer separating long 
without collateral over pooling long with collateral, short without collateral and short 
with collateral, respectively. These conditions also provide the maximum levels of 
signaling costs for which bad firms can afford to pool with good firms under the three 
pooling possibilities. The three conditions are more likely to hold if the proportion of 
bad firms is very high (θ  is low). In an extreme case, where θ  ≈ 0, the conditions 
will always hold, irrespective of the other parameters, since the right-hand side of 
these expressions then becomes 0, 0 and –b/k, which are always smaller than the left-
hand side of these expressions. For the remainder of the analysis, we introduce the 
above mentioned conditions as additional assumptions for the existence of separating 
signaling equilibria.  We denote the conditions (9), (10) and (11) as A12, A13 and 
A14, respectively: 
A12. 
*
lp C C ≥  where 
*
lp C is given by equality (9) 
A13. 
*
p b b ≥  where 
*
p b is given by equality (10)   20 
A14. 
*
sp C C ≥  where 
*
sp C is given by equality (11) 
 
4.4 REFINEMENT OF PBE BY APPLYING THE INTUITIVE CRITERION. 
Given the above-defined restrictions, the set of PBE is restricted to four borrowing 
strategies: pooling long without collateral, and three separating possibilities where 
bad firms do not signal and good firms can signal with different levels of collateral 
and short-term debt. In order to further restrict the set of equilibria by using the IC, 
we formulate the following lemma: 
Lemma 2: The pooling equilibrium, where both types of firms borrow long without 
collateral, does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion if one of the following conditions 
holds: 
i) 
2
lg lg lg
lg
(1 ) (2 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
b b b b b lp
g g lp
p C p p R kC p p R
p p R kC
 − + − + ≥ − 

− ≥ +  
 
ii) 
g (1 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
b b b s b b lp
g g lp
p p p R b p p R
p p R b
+ − + ≥ −  
 − ≥ +  
 
iii)
2
g
g
(1 ) (1 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
b b sg sg b b s b b lp
g g lp s
p p C kC p p R b p p R
p p R kC
 + − + + − + ≥ − 

− ≥ +  
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where Rlg, Rsg and Rlp are given by equations (3), (4) and (7), respectively. 
Under any of the above conditions, good firms are better off by deviating while bad 
firms are better off by staying at pooling. As a result, good firms tend to move away 
from the pooling equilibrium. The pooling long without collateral is therefore said to 
fail the Intuitive Criterion.  
Proof: See Appendix B. 
By precluding the pooling long without collateral, the above conditions guarantee the 
existence of separating equilibria. 
  
4.5 INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINTS 
Leaving out the borrowing possibilities that are not PBE, and ignoring the pooling 
equilibrium that does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion, we are endowed with the set 
of  candidate  separating  PBE  presented  by  cases  2,  10  and  14  in  Table  1.  In 
equilibrium,  good  firms  may  exercise  one  of  the  following  options  to  signal: 
borrowing long-term debt with collateral (Separation I), borrowing short-term debt 
without  collateral  (Separation  II),  or  borrowing  short-term  debt  with  collateral 
(Separation  III).    A  firm  will  choose  the  separating  possibility  that  is  the  most   22 
efficient and gives the highest value, under the condition that A1-A14 hold and that 
the separating is incentive compatible.
8   
We denote  ˆ e g and  ˆ e b as the incentive compatible contract chosen by good and bad 
firms, respectively, and  ˆ
g V and  ˆ
b V  as the values from incentive compatible contracts 
for good firms and bad firms, respectively. The ICCs are formulated as: 
ˆ ˆ ( , , ) argmax [ , , ]
ˆ ˆ ( , , ) argmax [ , , ]
g g b b
b b g g
U e g V EU e g V
U e b V EU e b V
≥
≥
 
The ICCs require firms to be honest about their type in separation, i.e. the ICCs 
induce firms to prefer their own contract rather than mimicking through a choice of 
the contracts for the other type. The following lemma details the ICCs. 
Lemma 3. The incentive compatibility requires the following conditions to hold 
i)
2 (1 ) (2 ) 1 lg lg lg
(2 ) 1 lg
p C p p R kC b b b
p p R kC g g lb
 − + − + ≥ 

− ≥ +  
    for Separation I, 
                                                            
8  Flannery  (1986)  does  not  examine  whether  the  separating  equilibrium  is  incentive 
compatible. He derives parameter restrictions for different types of equilibria (pooling and 
separating)  by  simply  comparing  values  for  high-quality  firms  under  different  pooling 
possibilities with the value for high-quality firms under a separating equilibrium. Thus, the 
actual conditions that allow high-quality firms to separate themselves from low-quality firms 
by  issuing  short-term  debt  are  expected  to  be  much  more  restrictive  than  those  given  in 
Flannery (1986).   23 
ii)
(1 ) 1 g
(2 ) 1
p p p R b b b b s
p p R b g g lb
+ − + ≥  
 − ≥ +  
    for Separation II,  
iii)
2 (1 ) (1 ) 1 g
(2 ) 1
p p C kC p p R b b b sg sg b b s
p p R kC b g g lb sg
 + − + + − + ≥ 

− ≥ + +  
  for Separation III 
where Rlg and Rsg are given by equation (3) and (4), respectively. 
Conditions i), ii) and iii) ensure that under Separations I, II and III, respectively, both 
types of firm will present themselves rather than mimicking the other type.  
Proof: See Appendix C. 
To derive feasible incentive compatible separating equilibria, we should also consider 
the  conditions  for  the  existence  of  separation.  More  specifically,  combining  the 
conditions implied by the IC in Lemma 2, and the ICC conditions in Lemma 3, we 
establish the following lemma.  
Lemma  4:  The  feasible  incentive  compatible  separating  equilibria  require  the 
following conditions to hold 
i)
2 (1 ) (2 ) 1 lg lg lg
(2 ) 1 lg
p C p p R kC b b b
p p R kC g g lp
 − + − + ≥ 

− ≥ +  
    for Separation I   24 
ii)
(1 ) 1 g
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    for Separation II 
iii)
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
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  for Separation III 
Proof: See Appendix D 
Lemma 4 implies the following for each candidate of separation in equilibrium 
For Separation I:  
(12)  d u k k k ≤ ≤  with   
2 2
lg
lg
lg
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(2 )
(2 ) 1
b g
d
g g
g g lp
u
p p C
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p p C
p p R
k
C
  − − − −   =
−
− −
=
  
From condition (12), we can derive the minimum level of collateral necessary for 
incentive compatibility to hold:  
(13)
2 2 (1 ) (1 )
(2 )(1 ) (2 )
p p b g Clgmin p p k p p g g b b
− − −
=
− + − −
 
Note that this level of collateral satisfies assumption A12: Clgmin > Clp*.  
Proof: see Appendix E1   25 
 
If Separation I occurs, good firms minimize signaling costs if they offer the minimum 
level of collateral, Clgmin. If they do so, the lower boundary of condition (12) will 
automatically be satisfied, since then kd = k. A feasible solution also requires that the 
upper boundary of condition (12) exceeds the lower boundary. Given that they choose 
Clgmin, it can be derived that Separation I may occur under the following condition:  
 (14) lgmin
1
lgmin
(2 ) (2 )(1 )
(2 ) (2 ) (2 ) (1 )
g g b b
g g g g b b
p p p p C
p p p p p p C
θ θ
− − − −
≤ =
  − + − − − −  
,  
For Separation II the following should hold: 
 (15)  bd < b < bu , with 
( )(1 )
(2 ) 1
g b b
d
g
u g g lp
p p p
b
p
b p p R
− −
=
= − −
 
Expression  (15)  implies  that  costs  of  short-term  debt  should  exceed  a  certain 
threshold to make it unattractive for bad firms to mimic good firms, and should be 
lower  than  another  threshold to induce  good  firms  to  be  truthful.  Note  that  bd  is 
always greater than bp
* given in assumption A13. 
Proof: see the appendix E2.   26 
Condition (15) is feasible if bd < bu . This implies:  
(16) 
2
2
(2 ) (2 ) ( )(1 )
(2 ) (2 ) ( )(1 )
g g b b g b b g
g g b b g b b g
p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p
θ θ
  − − − − − +  
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Thus  Separation  II  may  result  if  (15)  holds  and  a  necessary  (but  not  sufficient) 
condition that 2 θ θ ≤ . 
For Separation III the following must hold: 
 (17)  
* *
d u b b b ≤ ≤   with    
[ ]
*
*
d d d sg
u u sg
b b C k b
b b kC
= − +
= −
 
Note that condition (17) allows lower values of b as compared to condition (15). This 
can be explained by the fact that good firms simultaneously put up collateral and 
issue  costly  short-term  debt  under  this  separation.  Therefore,  even  forb bd < , 
separation may be incentive compatible as good firms now also signal with collateral. 
From condition (17), we can derive the minimum level of collateral that good firms 
need to offer for this separation:  
(18) b b d Csgmin b k d
−
=
+
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Equation (18) clearly shows that the minimum level of collateral needed to make 
separation  incentive  compatible  decreases  if  the  costs  of  issuing  short-term  debt 
increase. Note that Csgmin > Csp* , given by assumption A14, irrespective  of all 
parameters.  
Proof: see Appendix E3.  
If Separation III occurs, good firms will offer collateral of Csgmin. This guarantees that 
the lower boundary of condition (17) will be fulfilled since then
*
d b b = . To make the 
condition  feasible,  the  upper  boundary  should  exceed  the  lower  boundary  i.e. 
* *
d u b b ≤ . This requires:  
 (19) 
min
3
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(2 ) (2 ) 1 (1 )
(2 ) (2 ) 1 (1 )
g g b b d sg
g g b b d sg
p p p p b C
p p p p b C
θ θ
  − − − + −   ≤ =
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Note that for b < bd,  3 2 θ θ > independent of the other parameter values. The reverse 
holds  when  b  >  bd.  This  specification  is  relevant  to  distinguish  among  different 
separation possibilities, as will be analyzed in the following section. 
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4.6 THE LEAST-COST SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM 
The  final  point  in  our  analysis  of  the  optimal  loan  policy  under  asymmetric 
information is to solve for the least-cost separating equilibrium. It should be noticed 
that a separating equilibrium will only exist if the proportion of bad firms in the 
market is sufficiently high, [ ] 1 2 3 max , , θ θ θ θ < . Moreover, the conditions derived above 
imply that it is impossible that both Separations II and III are feasible. Separation III 
will  only  be  incentive  compatible  (for  positive  collateral  values)  if  b<bd  whereas 
Separation II requires bd<b<bu. However, the conditions as specified in equations 
(12), (15) and (17) may satisfy either Separations I and II, or Separations I and III. 
The least-cost separating equilibrium then determines the overall optimum outcome.  
We determine the least-cost separating equilibrium by comparing the value of good 
firms under the different separating equilibria. From equations (5) and (6), the values 
of  good  firms  under  the  three  alternative  separating  equilibria  can  be  derived  as 
follows, respectively:  
2
lg 3 4 lgmin
2
3 4
2
3 4 min
2 (1 ) 1
2 (1 ) 1
2 (1 ) 1
c g g g
sg g g g
sgc g g g sg
V p M p p M kC
V p M p M p b
V p M p M p kC b
= + − − −
= + − − −
= + − − − −
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where Clgmin and Csgmin are given by equation (13) and (18). We can now formulate the 
following Lemma.  
Lemma 5:  
(i)  Given  A1  –  A14,  and  if  parameter  values  are  such  that  Separation  long  with 
collateral and Separation short without collateral are both incentive compatible, good 
firms will opt to separate by borrowing short without collateral if b< kClgmin 
(ii) Given A1 – A14,  and if parameter  values are such that Separation long  with 
collateral and Separation short with collateral are both incentive compatible, good 
firms  will  opt  for  Separation  short  with  collateral  if  b  +  kCsgmin  <  kClgmin  or 
( ) lgmin 1
C b k d b k
bd
+  
< −  
 
 
From Lemma 5 it follows that θ 1 < θ 2 and θ 1 < θ 3 if conditions i) and ii) hold 
respectively. 
Proof: see Appendix F  
Lemma 5 provides a first step in determining the conditions for an overall optimal, 
i.e. least-cost equilibrium, given that the alternative Separations I, II and III are all 
incentive  compatible.  The  following  proposition  serves  to  prepare  a  next  step  in 
determining the least-cost separating equilibria.    30 
 
Proposition  2:    Under  A1-A14,  different  separating  equilibria  may  occur 
conditionally on the following parameter restrictions. 
o  Separation I is optimal if  
C1) θ <θ 1 and 
C2) b > max[bd,  kClgmin] or 
C3) 
( ) lgmin 1
C b k d k b bd bd
+  
− < <  
 
 
The least-cost separating signaling equilibrium is then characterized by the following 
implication: 
Clb=0; 
2 2 (1 ) (1 )
(2 )(1 ) (2 )
p p b g C C lg lgmin p p k p p g g b b
− − −
= = − + − −
; mg=l; mb=l;  
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R
p p
− −
=
−
 and 
) 2 (
1
b b
lb p p
R
−
=  
In equilibrium, both types of firms borrow long-term  debt; good  firms  put up an 
amount Clgmin of collateral while bad firms do not.      31 
o  Separation II is optimal if  
C4) bd < b<bu and θ 1<θ <θ 2 or 
C5) θ < θ 1 < θ 2 and bd < b< min[kClgmin, bu] 
The least-cost separating signaling equilibrium is then described by 
Cb=0; Cg=0; mg=s; mb=l; 
g
sg p
R
1
= and
) 2 (
1
b b
lb p p
R
−
= . 
In equilibrium, bad firms choose long-term debt without collateral and good firms opt 
for short-term debt without collateral. 
o  Separation III is optimal if  
C6) θ <θ 3 and  b <
( ) lgmin min 1 ,
C b k d k bd bd
  +  
−    
     
 
If C6 hold, the least cost separating equilibrium implies: 
Cb=0;  Cg=
b b d Csgmin b k d
−
=
+
;  mg=s;  mb=l;  g
1 (1 ) g sgmin
s
g
p C
R
p
− −
=   and 
) 2 (
1
b b
lb p p
R
−
= .   32 
The equilibrium entails bad firms having long-term debt without collateral and good 
firms having short-term debt with collateral. 
 
Note that the conditions in proposition 2 are derived from the parameter restrictions 
given by equation (13) through (19). It is worthwhile to further discuss proposition 2. 
Condition C1 implies that Separation I is feasible. Separation I will be the least cost 
separating equilibrium if, in addition to C1, both Separations II and III are either 
infeasible or incur higher signaling costs than Separation I. Condition C2 indicates 
that Separation III is not feasible because b > max (bd, kClgmin) while Separation II is 
more costly. On the contrary to condition C2, C3 indicates that Separation II is not 
feasible and Separation III is more costly than Separation I.  
Condition  (C4)  implies  that  Separation  II  is  incentive  compatible,  automatically 
precluding  Separation  III.  Condition  (C4)  also  rules  out  Separation  I  because  the 
values  of  θ   are  in  excess  of  θ 1,  making  Separation  II  the  least  cost  separating 
equilibrium. Moreover, if both Separations I and II are feasible, Separation II has the 
lowest cost if costs of borrowing short are lower than borrowing long with collateral. 
This is guaranteed by condition (C5). Similar restrictions for Separation III to be the 
least cost separating equilibrium are given by condition (C6). 
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5. WEALTH CONSTRAINTS AND EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS 
To better explain the empirical implications of our signaling model, in particular the 
impact of conditions C1 through C6, we describe a set of possible outcomes based on 
a model simulation. This allows us to specifically examine the impact of an increase 
in the difference between firm quality measured by pg – pb, and in the transaction 
costs of short-term debt b, for given values of k and θ. The graph below displays the 
results given a particular parameter setting with k = 0.7, θ = 0.2 and pb =0.49. The 
curves bu and bd are given by equation (15); the curves kClgmin and kClgmin(bd+k)/(bd)-k 
are given by conditions i) and ii) in Lemma 5. Notice that in this setting, separation 
always exists  for  all  possible values  of  b and  (pg-pb).  Separation  II  occurs  in  the 
shaded area enclosed by the bu, bd and kClgmin schedules. Separation III occurs in the 
area below the bd and kClgmin(bd+k)/(bd)-k curves. Finally, Separation I occurs in the 
remaining area.  
The  graph  shows  that  for  a  given  b  (below  the  intersection  of  the  kClgmin  and  bd 
schedules); see b for example, Separation I occurs for either small or large values of 
(pg  –  pb).    However,  for  intermediate  values  of  (pg  –  pb),  either  Separation  II  or 
Separation III results. This can be explained as follows. For small values of (pg – pb), 
bu and bd are too small to make Separation II and 3 feasible. For large values of (pg – 
pb),  Separations  II  and  III  can  be  feasible  but  apparently  more  expensive  than 
Separation I since the kClgmin and kClgmin(bd+k)/(bd)-k schedules fall below bd. This   34 
implies that two types of firms -slightly less risky firms and lowest risk firms- opt for 
secured debt at long maturities. Firms of intermediate risk will choose short maturities 
with or without collateral. Finally, the highest risk firms are settled with long-term, 
non-secured debt. 
In  addition,  the  graph  also  demonstrates  how  the  signaling  cost  b  influences  the 
Separation at equilibrium. For a given value of (pg – pb) (to the left of the intersection 
bd and kClgmin schedules), good firms signal by borrowing short with collateral for low 
values of b. A rise in b such that b is in excess of bd, leads good firms first to signal 
by borrowing short without collateral. However, if the transaction costs of short term 
debt  rise  dramatically,  Separation  I  will  outdo  Separation  II,  since  Separation  II 
appears to be either unfeasible or more costly than Separation I. 
 
Figure 2. Different separating outcomes, given parameter values k = 0.7, θ =0.2 and pb = 0.49.    35 
In summary, our theoretical analysis and in particular the simulation results provide 
several  empirical  implications.  Firstly,  we  show  that  the  resulting  separating  or 
pooling equilibrium depends on a combination of parameters. 
1)  θ:  higher values make separation less likely.  
As previously noted, a separating equilibrium only exists if the proportion of good 
firms  θ  is  sufficiently  low,  i.e.  [ ] 1 2 3 max , , θ θ θ θ ≤ .  By  intuition,  the  higher  the 
proportion of good firms in the credit market, the less rewarding for good firms to 
signal their true quality by separation.  
2)  b: higher values make signaling by long-term debt with collateral more likely 
3)  k: higher values make signaling by short-term debt without collateral more likely. 
An increase in the costs of a given signaling mechanism, i.e. b of short-term debt and 
k of collateral, will induce the alternative mechanisms to be optimal in equilibrium.    
4)  (pg – pb): higher values increase the threshold values forθ, below which one of the 
separating equilibria is feasible, thereby increasing the likelihood of separating.  
Secondly, our signaling framework suggests a non-monotonic relationship between 
firm quality and debt maturity, with high quality firms having both long-term secured 
debt and short-term secured or non-secured debt.   36 
Overall, the analysis shows that the signaling outcome cannot be described with a 
simple  rule,  such  as  high  quality  firms  will  offer  collateral  (as  in  the  standard 
signaling models with collateral) or high quality firms will borrow short (as in the 
standard debt maturity signaling models). Rather, the use of a certain signaling device 
should  be  simultaneously  determined  under  the  interactions  with  other  signaling 
devices. Our model provides a theoretical justification for a broad range of possible 
optimal debt contracts that allow good firms to signal their quality: they may borrow 
short  - with or without  collateral  -  or they  may  borrow long with  collateral.  The 
decision depends on the relative costs of the signaling devices, the difference in firm 
quality and the proportion of good firms in the market. 
Finally, we consider one simple extension of the model. In the analysis so far we have 
assumed that there is no wealth constraint. However, in the context of small firm 
financing in developing countries this assumption does not seem to be realistic. A 
wealth constraint implies that the firms’ collaterizable wealth W is smaller than the 
necessary level of collateral. From the previous analysis, we know that Separation I 
requires good firms to borrow long with collateral of Clgmin and Separation III requires 
good firms to borrow short with collateral of Csgmin, Clgmin and Csgmin as given by 
equations (13) and (18). It can be proved that Csgmin <Clgmin, irrespective of other 
parameters.  
Proof: see Appendix G   37 
So, there will be a wealth constraint if  W <  Clgmin.  If W < Csgmin <Clgmin, good firms 
do not have a sufficient amount of collateral to be able to separate by borrowing long 
with collateral or short with collateral. Separation II turns out to be the only signaling 
option, provided that the cost of short-term debt is sufficiently high. If  Csgmin < W 
<Clgmin, good firms can still put up collateral to back their short-term debt, but not 
their  long-term  debt.  Therefore,  Separation  I  will  never  occur  in  equilibrium. 
Separation II or Separation III will result conditionally on the cost of short-term debt 
and other parameter values. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper develops a model in which firms may signal with two debt attributes, 
duration and collateral. The analysis shows that different separating equilibria may 
result.  If  Separation  occurs,  low-quality  firms  will  always  borrow  long  without 
collateral, while high-quality firms will borrow long with collateral or borrow short 
with  or  without  collateral.  The  least-cost  separating  equilibrium  depends  on  the 
relative signaling costs of the different signaling mechanism and the difference in 
firm quality. The analysis also indicates that separation will be more likely if the 
proportion of low-quality firms in the market is high. In addition, the simultaneous 
use of debt maturity and collateral as signaling devices plays a more significant role if   38 
the disparity in firm quality decreases. When a wealth constraint is imposed, the role 
of collateral as a signaling  device  is  undermined,  and  high-quality  firms  have  no 
choice but to signal with short-term debt. This is probably the most relevant outcome 
for developing countries where wealth constraints are severe.  
Model simulations suggest a non-monotonic relationship between firm quality and 
debt maturity, with high quality firms having both long-term secured debt and short-
term  secured  or  non-secured  debt.  More  importantly,  the  analysis  clarifies  that  a 
proper empirical test of theoretical signaling models is not simple. Empirically testing 
the implications of signaling models requires at minimum that the relative costs of the 
different signaling devices be taken into account. To our knowledge this has not yet 
been done, but certainly is an important area for future empirical research.  
The  model  we  have  developed  concentrates  on  the  signaling  properties  of  debt 
maturity and collateral. Further research aims to enrich the analysis by including other 
factors  associated  with  the  debt  maturity  and  collateral  decisions.  It  may  be 
interesting, for instance, to introduce liquidity risk of short-term debt, allowing for a 
costly transfer of ownership in case of liquidation.  
 APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1 
We will prove here that for the conditions specified in Lemma 1, bad firms prefer 
switching to the full information contract (the outcome for these firms if separation   39 
occurs), irrespective of bank beliefs. We consider the case where banks perceive a 
deviating action to be carried out by firms of low quality. If bad firms prefer to 
deviate under this belief, they will certainly do so under other beliefs of banks (i.e. if 
the bank thinks that the deviating action is carried out by good firms). 
If both types of firms pool by borrowing long with some amount of collateral, the 
model has a continuum of pooling equilibria, which are all Pareto inferior. Suppose 
the equilibrium level of collateral is Clp, where each Clp in the interval [0, Clp*] 
supports a different equilibrium. We can now find the value of Clp
*, the greatest 
possible level of collateral generated by a pooling equilibrium. The pooling 
equilibrium is defined as follows, where Clp ∈ [0, Clp
*]:  
2 2
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Bad firms prefer to deviate from the candidate pooling equilibrium if the following 
holds: 
2
l 3 4 2 (1 ) 1
p
b b b b lbc V p M p p M V = + − − >  
where Vlb denotes the value of bad firms under Separation long without collateral, and 
Vlbc
p
 denotes the value of bad firms at pooling long with collateral.   40 
This implies that: 
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If both types of firms pool by issuing short-term debt without collateral, the candidate 
pooling equilibrium is defined as:  
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Bad firms have incentives to deviate if pooling provides a lower value than the value 
of staying off-equilibrium: 
2
3 4 2 (1 ) 1
p
lb b b b sb V p M p p M V = + − − ≥  
where Vlb denotes the value of bad firms under Separation long without collateral, and  
p
sb V denotes the value of bad firms at pooling short without collateral. 
The following is obtained: 
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.  
Finally,  if  both  types  of  firms  pool by  borrowing short with collateral, again  the 
model allows for a continuum of pooling equilibria. Suppose the equilibrium level of   41 
collateral  is  Csp  -  where  each  Csp  in  the  interval  [0,  Csp*]  supports  a  different 
equilibrium- the pooling is characterized:  
2 2
3 4 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( | , ) 1
( | , ) 1
g b
g b sp
p
sic i i i i i spc i i sp sp
sp
sp
m m s
C C C
V p M p p M p p R p p C kC b
Prob i b m s C C
Prob i b m l C C
θ
= = 

= = 
 = + − − − − − − − − 
 = = = = − 
 = = ≠ = 
 
We will determine Csp* - the maximum level of collateral in equilibrium. Like the 
previous cases, bad firms prefer to deviate from the candidate pooling equilibrium if 
the following holds: 
2
3 4 2 (1 ) 1
p
lb b b b sbc V p M p p M V = + − − >   
where Vlb denotes the value of bad firms under Separation long without collateral, and  
p
sbc V denotes the value of bad firms at pooling short with collateral. 
or  
* (1 )(1 )( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 )( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
g b g b g g b b
sp
g b g b g g b b
p p p p b p p p p
C C
p p p p k p p p p
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
  − − − − − + − −   ≥ =
  − − − + − + − −  
  
For  any  value  of  Csp  greater  than  Csp*,  bad  firms  prefer  deviating  over  pooling, 
irrespective of the bank’s belief. 
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Consider  the  following  characterization  of  the  perfectly  Bayesian  pooling 
equilibrium:  
2
3 4
0
( | , 0)
( | ) 0
( | 0) 0
2 (1 ) (2 )
g b
g b lp
p
li i i i i i lp
b
m m l
C C C
Prob i g m l C
Prob i g m s
Prob i g C
V V p M p p M p p R
V V
θ
= = 

= = = 
 = = = =
  = = = 
 = > = 
 = = + − − −

=  
 
we show that this pooling equilibrium does not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. 
In equilibrium, both types of firms pool by issuing non-secured long-term debt, and 
thus no extra cost is incurred and signaling is uninformative. Rationally, the bank 
knows that the proportion of good firms is θ hence it will charge the pooling loan rate 
of Rlp to all borrowing firms. If we assume that the bank perceives the willingness to 
borrow  short  and/or  a  placement  of  collateral  to  be  from  low  quality  firms  and 
accordingly offers a loan contract designed for bad firms, no firm will deviate from 
the pooling equilibrium, given the signaling cost they must pay and the lower value 
they will obtain (
p
b li V V < ). Therefore, the pooling long without collateral appears as 
a PBE, provided it is upheld by the bank’s belief as specified  
if m = l and C = 0 
if m = s and/or C >0   43 
By introducing the Intuitive Criterion, we will consider whether or not such a belief is 
reasonable.  If  parameters  exist such  that the  specified  bank’s off-equilibrium-path 
belief is not intuitive, the perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium does not survive the 
Intuitive Criterion and thus will be precluded from the set of PBE.  
Firms of any type have three options to deviate from pooling: (i) posting collateral to 
back  their  long-term  debt,  (ii)  borrowing  short-term  debt  without  collateral;  (iii) 
borrowing short-term debt with collateral. Firms bear some deviating costs, which 
may  be  costs  of  short-term  debt  or  cost  of  collateralization.  As  to  bad  firms,  by 
deviating they wish to fool the bank into believing them in their fake quality. As to 
good firms, by deviating they wish to convince the bank into believing in their true 
quality. If bad firms are indifferent about pooling and deviating, whereas good firms 
have  incentives  to  deviate,  it  is  reasonable  for  the  bank  to  believe  the  deviating 
behavior  to  be  carried  out  by  good  firms.  If  so,  the  belief  as  specified  appears 
unreasonable and the pooling is said to fail the IC. We will now show that this holds 
in our model under certain parameters. 
 
We first analyze the bad firms’ behavior. Note that bad firms have the following 
options to deviate from pooling by mimicking good firms and providing the bank 
with one of the signals: (i) posting collateral; (ii) borrowing short without collateral;   44 
(iii) borrowing short with collateral. Bad firms have to bear some deviating costs, 
which may be costs of short-term debt or cost of collateralization. In return, they will 
fool  the  bank  into  believing  in  their  fake  high  quality.  Bad  firms’  value  with 
mimicking behavior are given by  
(B1) lg lg lg
2
4 3
2 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 kC R p p C p p M p M p V b b b b b b
mimic
lbc − − − − − − + =  
(B2)
2
3 4 2 (1 ) (1 )
mimic
sb b b b b b b sg V p M p M p p p p R b = + − − − − −  
(B3) b kC R p p C p p p M p M p V sg sg b b sg b b b b b
mimic
sbc − − − − − − − − + = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
2
4 3
2
 
The subscripts lbc, sb, sbc represent bad firms mimicking the behavior of good firms 
under the three above-mentioned alternatives. If bad firms pretend to be good firms, 
they will obtain the  debt contract, i.e. the loan rate  and the  amount  of  collateral, 
designed for good firms. The interest rates Rlg and Rsg can be derived from equation 
(3) and (4).  
If bad firms decide to pool, their value is: 
(B4)
2
3 4 2 (1 ) (2 )
p
lb b b b b b lp V p M p p M p p R = + − − −  
Bad firms are indifferent about pooling and deviating if the following holds.   45 
(B5)
mimic p
lbc lb
mimic p
sb lb
mimic p
sbc lb
V V
V V
V V
 ≤

≤ 
 ≤ 
or 
2
2
( 5 )(1 ) (2 ) (2 )
( 5 ) (1 ) (2 )
( 5 ) (1 ) (1 ) (2 )
b lg b b lg lg b b lp
b b b sg b b lp
b b sg sg b b sg b b lp
B a p C p p R kC p p R
B b p p p R b p p R
B c p p C kC p p R b p p R
 − + − + ≥ −

+ − + ≥ − 

+ − + + − + ≥ −  
 
Next,  we  analyze  the  behavior  of  good  firms.  Good  firms  may  also  deviate  by 
signaling if they benefit from doing so. Like bad firms, good firms also have three 
alternatives to deviate: i) posting collateral; (ii) borrowing short without collateral; 
(iii) borrowing short with collateral. Their values are equal to: 
(B6)
2
lg 3 4 lg 2 (1 ) 1 c g g g V p M p p M kC = + − − −  
(B7) 
2
3 4 2 (1 ) 1 sg g g g V p M p p M b = + − − −  
(B8)
2
g 3 4 g 2 (1 ) 1 s c g g g s V p M p p M kC b = + − − − −  
If good firms pool, their value is: 
(B9)
2
3 4 2 (1 ) (2 )
p
lg g g g g g lp V p M p p M p p R = + − − −    46 
Good firms prefer to deviate if the following holds:   
(B10)
p
lgc lg
p
sg lg
p
sgc lg
V V
V V
V V
 ≥

≥ 

≥  
 or 
lg
g
( 10 ) (2 ) 1
( 10 ) (2 ) 1
( 10 ) (2 ) 1
g g lp
g g lp
g g lp s
B a p p R kC
B b p p R b
B c p p R kC b
 − ≥ +

− ≥ + 
 − ≥ + + 
 
This system of inequalities implies that the deviating options are more profitable than 
pooling.  
If parameters exist such that one equation in (B5) and its corresponding inequality in 
(B10) hold simultaneously, good firms are able to convince the bank that they are 
indeed better off by deviating than by staying on the equilibrium path. In order to 
support a deviating behavior by good firms, the reasonable off-equilibrium-path belief 
of the bank should be Prob (i=g|m=s, C>0) = 1. In other words, the off-equilibrium-
path belief as specified in the pooling definition appears to be unreasonable. Hence, 
the pooling fails to meet the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion.  
Each equation in (B5) and its counterpart in (B10) hold simultaneously if the 
following conditions are satisfied:    47 
i) 
2 (1 ) (2 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
b lg b b lg lg b b lp
g g lp lg
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ii) 
g (1 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
b b b s b b lp
g g lp
p p p R b p p R
p p R b
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iii)
2 (1 ) (1 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
b b sg sg b b sg b b lp
g g lp sg
p p C kC p p R b p p R
p p R kC
 + − + + − + ≥ − 

− ≥ +  
 
Under any of the above conditions, a pooling long without collateral does not survive 
the Intuitive Criterion.  Accordingly, it will be discarded from the set of PBE. 
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 3 
For each separation, the incentive compatibility constraints (ICCs) guarantee firms to 
be honest about their type. In other words, the ICCs require the true value to be in 
excess of the mimicking value for firms of both types. We first derive the mimicking 
value equations under the three separation possibilities as follows: 
2 2
3 4 2 (1 ) (1 ) (2 )
mimic
lbc b b b b lg b b lg lg V p M p M p p C p p R kC = + − − − − − −  
2
3 4 2 (1 ) (1 )
mimic
sb b b b b b b sg V p M p M p p p p R b = + − − − − −  
b kC R p p C p p p M p M p V sg sg b b sg b b b b b
mimic
sbc − − − − − − − − + = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
2
4 3
2    48 
2 2 (1 ) (2 ) 3 4
mimic V p M p M p p p R g g g g g lb lg = + − − −  
Where 
mimic
lbc V , 
mimic
sb V and 
mimic
sbc V  respectively represent values of bad firms when 
mimicking  the  behavior  of  good  firms  under  Separations  I,  II  and  III.  Similarly, 
mimic
lg V indicates the value of good firms when pretending to be bad firms under the 
three Separations. The ICCs imply 
 
mimic
lb lbc
mimic
lgc lg
V V
V V
 ≥ 

≥  
 for Separation I, 
 
mimic
lb sb
mimic
sg lg
V V
V V
 ≥ 

≥  
 for Separation II, 
and  
mimic
lb sbc
mimic
sgc lg
V V
V V
 ≥ 

≥  
for Separation III 
With Vlb and Vlgc, Vsg, Vsgc referring to the true values of bad firms and good firms 
under separation. We rewrite the above expressions as: 
i)
2 (1 ) (2 ) 1 lg lg lg
(2 ) 1 lg
p C p p R kC b b b
p p R kC g g lb
 − + − + ≥ 

− ≥ +  
    for Separation I,   49 
ii)
(1 ) 1 g
(2 ) 1
p p p R b b b b s
p p R b g g lb
+ − + ≥  
 − ≥ +  
    for Separation II, 
iii)
2 (1 ) (1 ) 1 g
(2 ) 1
p p C kC p p R b b b sg sg b b s
p p R kC b g g lb sg
 + − + + − + ≥ 

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  for Separation III 
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 4 
The feasible incentive compatible separating equilibria may result if both conditions 
implied  by  the  Intuitive  Criterion  and  the  Incentive  Compatibility  Constraint  are 
satisfied. We rewrite the IC given by Lemma 2, and the ICCs given by Lemma 3 as 
follows:  
IC1) 
2
lg lg lg
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(1 ) (2 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
b b b b b lp
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for Separation I 
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 for Separation II 
IC3)
2
g
g
(1 ) (1 ) (2 )
(2 ) 1
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 for Separation III 
Under  the  IC,  bad  firms  find  pooling  better  than  lying  while  good  firms  find 
separating more attractive than pooling.    50 
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  for Separation III 
Under the ICCs, bad firms prefer truth-telling to lying whereas good firms prefer 
truth-telling to lying by pretending to be bad firms.  
Now, the combination of both the ICs and the ICCs for each Separation result in the 
following conditions: 
i)
2 (1 ) (2 ) 1 lg lg lg
(2 ) 1 lg
p C p p R kC b b b
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    for Separation I, 
ii)
(1 ) 1 g
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    for Separation II, 
iii)
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
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  for Separation III   51 
Note that, the lower boundary of each condition is derived from the ICCs, and the 
upper  boundary  is  derived  from  the  IC.  For  bad  firms,  pooling  is  better  than 
presenting  as  themselves  at  separation.  For  good  firms,  pooling  is  better  than 
pretending to be bad firms at separation. The pooling possibility here refers to the 
zero-signaling cost pooling, which is ruled out by the Intuitive Criterion under certain 
conditions given in Lemma 2.  
APPENDIX E1: PROOF Clgmin > Clp
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increases in θ  and 
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*
lgmin 0 lp C C ≤ ≤  
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 in an increasing 
function ofθ , 
*
p b  = 0 when θ  = 0 and 
*
p b  = bd when θ  = 1. This yields 
*
p b  < bd.    52 
 
APPENDIX E3: PROOF Csgmin > Csp
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increases  in  θ   and 
*
sp C   <  0  when  θ   =  0  and 
*
sp C   =  Csgmin  when  θ   =  1.  So, 
*
gmin sp s C C ≤  
APPENDIX F1: PROOF IF b kC d lgmin <  then 
1 2 θ θ ≤  . 
For the sake of simplicity, we rewrite the relevant expressions as follows: 
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Inserting Clgmin into θ 1, we obtain    53 
1
(1 ) (2 ) (2 )
(1 ) (2 ) (2 ) (2 )
g g b b
g g b b g g
k p p p p
k p p p p kp p
θ
  + − − −   =
  + − − − + −  
 
Since θ 2 decreases in bd, inserting b kC d lgmin ≤ , we have: 
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So θ 2  > θ 1 always holds if   b kC d lgmin ≤  
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Inserting Csgmin, we obtain   54 
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APPENDIX G: PROOF Csgmin < Clgmin 
From the analysis we have 
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If one rewrites this expression, the inequality becomes: 
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Since the left-hand side is positive and right-hand side is negative, the inequality 
always holds.   56 
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